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COOPER V. AARON AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Christopher W. Schmidt
*
 
“[T]he Federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution.” 
— Cooper v. Aaron (1958)1 
 
“The logic of Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the basic principles 
of democratic government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule of 
law.” 
— Attorney General Edwin Meese III (1986)2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The greatest Supreme Court opinions are complex heroes. They have 
those attributes that make people recognize them as great: the strategic 
brilliance and bold assertion of the authority of judicial review in Marbury 
v. Madison;3 the common-sense refutation of the fallacies that justified racial 
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education;4 the recognition that something 
as fundamental as a right to privacy must be a part of our constitutional 
protections in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 But they also have flaws, blind 
spots, and complications. Marbury was the product of a dizzying array of 
craven politics, flagrant violations of judicial ethics, and tendentious legal 
analysis.6 In Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren narrowed the Court’s holding 
by unconvincingly differentiating segregated schools from other forms of 
state-mandated segregation and then referencing questionable claims about 
the psychological damage of black children to justify that holding.7 Justice 
 
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, and Co-Director, Institute on 
the Supreme Court of the United States (ISCOTUS), Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty 
Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Editor, Law & Social Inquiry. 
 1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 2. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987 (1987) 
(address at Tulane University, October 21, 1986). 
 3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 6.  JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS 
TIMES 243–61 (2018); William W. Van Alsytne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–33 (1969). 
 7. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE 
L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960). 
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William O. Douglas’s opinion of the Court in Griswold, with its reliance on 
“penumbras” and “emanations” of enumerated rights, has been reduced to a 
laugh line for constitutional lawyers.8 
So too Cooper v. Aaron.9 Its attributes of greatness are self-evident. In 
language more resonant and forceful than Warren’s carefully measured 
words in Brown, the Justices in Cooper denounced the white South’s 
continuing commitment to segregation. To amplify the Court’s unanimity, 
each of the nine justices attached his name to the ruling. Yet for a decision 
that on the surface seems so right, Cooper has attracted an unusual 
collection of critics, people from across the ideological spectrum who 
believe that in the Court’s effort to undermine the legitimacy of the white 
supremacist backlash against Brown, the Justices went too far and thereby 
got something very wrong. The target of this critique is the Court’s claim 
that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the Constitution” 
and “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this 
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”10 This claim of 
judicial interpretive supremacy—the idea that the Court is the ultimate and 
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution and that the American people must 
defer to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as if it were the 
Constitution itself11—has been condemned as mistaken, nonsensical, a 
power grab by the Supreme Court, and an affront to the most fundamental 
principle of a constitutional democracy.12 
In this Essay, I offer a brief biography of this particular hero of 
American constitutional history, with a focus on its complexities, on its 
interwoven strands of moral stature and bluster. My portrait of Cooper 
includes the history that led the Justices to craft an opinion that contained 
 
 8. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME 1, at 43 
(3rd ed. 2000) (describing Douglas’s reference to “penumbras, formed by emanations” as 
“twilight zone talk”). 
 9. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 10. Id. at 18. 
 11. Other efforts to encapsulate the strong judicial supremacist position include KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 7 (2007) (“Judicial 
supremacy asserts that the Constitution is what the judges say it is, not because the 
Constitution has no objective meaning or that the courts could not be wrong but because there 
is no alternative interpretive authority beyond the Court.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 (1999) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department—and no one else—to say what the law is. Once we say what the 
law is, that’s the end of it. After that, no one obliged to support the Constitution can fairly 
assert that the Constitution means something different from what we said it meant.”); and 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 125 (2004) (defining judicial supremacy as “the notion that judges have the last word 
when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning 
of the Constitution for everyone”). 
 12. See infra Part V. 
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such a mix of the laudable and contestable.13 It then surveys the debates over 
Cooper and its proclamation of judicial supremacy that have taken place 
ever since, each bout of criticism invariably followed by flurries of defenses 
of the decision.14 I conclude with an effort to explain why Cooper remains 
such a complex presence in the history of the Supreme Court.15 
II. TO THE SUPREME COURT 
How did the Justices arrive at the point in September 1958 where they 
agreed it necessary to so starkly proclaim themselves supreme above all 
challengers in giving meaning to the Constitution? The story of the road to 
Cooper has often been told. But even for those who are familiar with its 
basic contours, the sheer drama of the events—the twists and turns, the 
striking scenes of confrontation, the personalities involved, and of course 
the raw heroism of the black students who were at the center of the 
maelstrom—remains gripping and shocking. The extraordinary background 
to Cooper helps explain why the Court felt compelled in this case to 
articulate such an extraordinary proclamation of its own authority. 
In the spring of 1955, before the Supreme Court issued its second 
Brown ruling providing guidelines for implementing school desegregation,16 
the Little Rock school board approved a gradual desegregation plan for the 
city’s public schools.17 Desegregation would begin with a small number of 
black students attending one of the city’s high schools, Central High School, 
the following fall; the plan called for all Little Rock schools to be 
desegregated after eight years.18 The Little Rock chapter of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged 
the school board’s plan in federal court in February 1956, arguing that the 
gradualist plan failed to meet the requirements the Court laid out in Brown 
 
 13. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
 16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 17. Soon after Brown I, the Little Rock District School Board stated, “It is our 
responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so 
when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed.” Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (quoting Statement, Little Rock District School Board, Supreme 
Court Decision-Segregation in Public Schools (May 23, 1954)). On May 24, 1955, seven 
days before the Court issued Brown II, the school board approved a desegregation plan. Id. 
On the background to the school board’s moderate stance on desegregation during this 
period, see JOHN KIRK, REDEFINING THE COLOR LINE: BLACK ACTIVISM IN LITTLE ROCK, 
ARKANSAS, 1940–1970, at 92–94 (2002). 
 18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8. 
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II.19 In August 1956, Judge John E. Miller dismissed the NAACP’s lawsuit 
and approved the plan.20 After more delays, the federal court issued a series 
of additional orders to begin desegregation, and the Little Rock school 
district began to prepare for its desegregation plan. 
White segregationists in Arkansas then mobilized and turned the tide 
against these modest desegregation efforts.21 Governor Orval Faubus, who 
had initially appeared willing to quietly accept Brown,22 now adopted a 
defiant tone, declaring he would not be forced to accept “a change to which 
the people are overwhelmingly opposed.”23 The March 1956 release of the 
“Southern Manifesto”—a statement signed by nearly every southern 
member of Congress that denounced Brown as an “unwarranted decision” 
and a “clear abuse of judicial power” and vowed to “use all lawful means to 
bring about a reversal of this decision”24—fueled the incipient resistance 
movement in Arkansas.25 In a November 1956 referenda, Arkansas voters 
adopted a series of measures designed to oppose school desegregation.26 In 
the spring of 1957, the Arkansas legislature passed a law that removed the 
mandatory school attendance policy for children who were required to 
attend integrated public schools.27 The legislature also established a State 
Sovereignty Commission and empowered school boards to spend district 
funds to pay for legal representation in lawsuits over integration.28 A federal 
appeals court would describe the state’s machinations as “a systematic 
campaign” that had the result of “undermin[ing] whatever confidence the 
 
 19. In the year following its introduction in the spring of 1955, the school board had 
weakened its desegregation plan. The revised version included opening a new all-black high 
school. KIRK, supra note 17, at 96–99. 
 20. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d, 243 F.2d 361 (8th 
Cir. 1957). 
 21. See Tony Badger, “The Forerunner of Our Opposition”: Arkansas and the Southern 
Manifesto of 1956, 56 ARK. HIST. Q. 353, 354–55 (1997). 
 22. KIRK, supra note 17, at 89. 
 23. Badger, supra note 21, at 355. According to historian Tony Badger, “Faubus’s 
moderate strategy in 1956 was predicated on the notion that concessions to segregationist 
pressure would enable moderates like himself to stay in office and defuse the extremist threat. 
Instead, he found that in a battle where one side is prepared to mount a righteous crusade to 
defy the Supreme Court and the other wants to keep quiet, the extremists were going to win.” 
Id. at 360. 
 24. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–64 (1956) (Declaration of Constitutional Principles). 
 25. Badger, supra note 21, 356–59. 
 26. These included: a constitutional amendment commanding the state legislature to 
oppose “in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional desegregation decisions” in 
Brown I and Brown II, Ark. Const. amend. 44 (repealed 1990); and a pupil assignment law, 
Ark. Stat. §§ 80-1519 to 80-1524. 
 27. Ark. Stat. § 80-1525. 
 28. Ark. Stat. §§ 6-801 to 6-824. See generally Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 15 
(E.D. Ark. 1958) (detailing resistance to school desegregation in Arkansas), rev’d, 257 F.2d 
33 (8th Cir. 1958). 
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public might have had in the plan to integrate the public schools.”29 Under 
these increasingly volatile circumstances, Little Rock school authorities 
made final preparations in the summer of 1957 to begin desegregation. 
Governor Faubus had other plans. He now placed himself squarely at 
the head of the segregationist resistance movement.30 On September 2, the 
day before Central High School was scheduled to begin its school year, he 
announced that as a concession to the majority of voters who opposed 
desegregation and in response to the threat of violence, he would order 
the National Guard to block enforcement of the desegregation plan at 
Central High School.31 The next day, Judge Davies of the federal district 
court ordered the school to proceed with the desegregation plan already 
approved by the court.32 On the morning of September 4, nine black students 
who had been allowed to enroll in Central High School—known to history 
as the Little Rock Nine—arrived at their new school.33 Members of the 
National Guard, acting under orders from Faubus, blocked them from 
entering.34 The school board asked for a stay, which, on September 7, the 
court denied.35 After a series of appeals, and negotiations with President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Faubus agreed to withdraw the National Guard—
which had remained in place with instructions to keep the black students out 
of Central High School—and let the desegregation plan proceed.36 On 
September 23, under the protection of the Little Rock Police Department, 
the Little Rock Nine entered Central High School.37 But after withdrawing 
the troops, Faubus did nothing to provide protection for the black students.38 
 
 29. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1958). 
 30. On Faubus’s opportunistic evolution from racial moderate to diehard segregationist, 
see KIRK, supra note 17, at 101–05, 113–14. 
 31. STATE OF ARK. EXEC. DEP’T., PROCLAMATION (1957), reprinted in Governor’s 
Action, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 937, 937 (1957). 
 32. Order to Show Cause, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 938, 938–39 (1957). 
 33. On the Little Rock Nine, see KIRK, supra note 17, at 108–12. 
 34. Id. at 115, 117. 
 35. Board Seeks Stay, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 939, 941 (1957). “I have a Constitutional 
duty and obligation from which I shall not shrink,” declared Judge Davies in denying the 
petition. “In an organized society there can be nothing but ultimate confusion and chaos if 
court decrees are flaunted, whatever the pretext. That we, and each of us, has a duty to 
conform to the law of the land and the decrees of its duly constituted tribunals is too 
elementary to require elaboration.” Id. at 940; see also Robert E. Baker, Little Rock’s Bid For 
More Time Termed ‘Anemic’, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1957, at A1. 
 36. See Proceedings Against Governor, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 942, 942–63 (1957); JAMES 
F. SIMON, EISENHOWER V. WARREN: THE BATTLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES ch. 11 
(2018). 
 37. See ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT 
SHOCKED THE NATION 170–74 (2007). 
 38. Id. 
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With a large crowd of hostile whites amassed outside the school, the Nine 
were pulled out of the school after just a few hours.39 
President Eisenhower faced a crisis that not only made him look weak 
in the eyes of the nation, but also embarrassed the nation in the eyes of the 
world.40 Little Rock’s mayor sent the President desperate telegrams begging 
him to act.41 Just two months before, the President had declared that he 
could not “imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to 
send federal troops . . . into any area to enforce the orders of a federal court. 
. . .”42 Now, Eisenhower felt compelled to use his power to enforce school 
desegregation in Little Rock. On September 24, he called in Army troops to 
restore order and allow the desegregation plan to go forward.43 He delivered 
a speech to the nation that evening about the crisis in which he denounced 
the “demagogic extremists” and “disorderly mobs” that “have deliberately 
prevented the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal Court. . . . Mob 
rule cannot be allowed to override the decisions of our courts.”44 
“We are now an occupied territory,” Faubus lamented in his own 
address.45 “[B]y the use of Federal troops without proper request, rights just 
as precious, if not more so, than integration have been trampled into the dust 
under the boots of paratroopers or cut to pieces by their shiny unsheathed 
bayonets.”46 
Eight of the original nine black students attended Central High School 
through the remainder of the school year.47 Their white classmates subjected 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 4 (2000). 
 41. Telegram from Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann to President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
(Sept. 24, 1957) (on file with the Eisenhower Digital Archives at https://www.eisenhower. 
archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_little_rock/1957_09_24_Mann_to_DD
E.pdf) (“I am pleading to you as president of the United States in the interest of humanity, 
law and order and because of democracy world wide [sic] to provide the necessary federal 
troops. . . .”). 
 42. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (July 17, 1957) 
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-
conference-298). 
 43. SIMON, supra note 36, at 306. 
 44. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Address to the American 
People on the Situation in Little Rock (Sept. 24, 1957) (transcript available at https://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-and-television-address-the-american-people-the-
situation-little-rock). 
 45. Text of Faubus Address on Little Rock Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1957, at 
10. 
 46. Id. 
 47. The troops from the 101st Airborne Division were replaced by federalized National 
Guardsmen, who remained at the school for the rest of the school year. 
2019] COOPER V. AARON AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 261 
them to a steady stream of harassment.48 Hundreds of white students were 
suspended for their abusive behavior.49 The school was also subject to 
regular bomb threats.50 
The winter of 1958 saw a new round of litigation, and this one would 
make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Little Rock school board filed 
suit in federal court on February 20, 1958, seeking a delay in implementing 
its desegregation plan.51 On June 20, Judge Harry Lemley approved a plan 
that would delay desegregation until 1960.52 In his opinion, he emphasized 
the resistance of whites in Little Rock to the desegregation plan, quoting a 
vice principal at Central High School who described the experience of the 
1957–58 academic year as one of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil. . . .”53 The 
resulting “situation of tension and unrest among the school administrators, 
the classroom teachers, the pupils, and the latters’ parents inevitably had an 
adverse effect upon the educational program,” he worried.54 “[T]he orderly 
administration of the school was practically disrupted” and “educational 
standards have suffered.”55 The chaotic situation cannot be attributed to 
“mere lawlessness,” Judge Lemley wrote. 
Rather, the source of the trouble was the deep seated popular opposition 
in Little Rock to the principle of integration, which, as is known, runs 
counter to the pattern of southern life which has existed for over three 
hundred years. The evidence also shows that to this opposition was 
added the conviction of many of the people of Little Rock, that the 
Brown decisions do not truly represent the law, and that by virtue of the 
 
 48. See, e.g., JACOWAY, supra note 37, at 214–41; KIRK, supra note 17, at 119–23; 
MELBA PATTILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE TO 
INTEGRATE LITTLE ROCK’S CENTRAL HIGH (1994); DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF 
LITTLE ROCK 113–60 (1962). 
 49. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 327 (2004). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Ark. 1958), rev’d, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 
1958). 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. Id. at 20–21. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Id. The judge offered summaries of testimony by teachers and school staff detailing 
the difficulties they faced. Id. at 22–25. Judge Lemley also wrote, 
In reaching this conclusion [to grant the injunction] we are not unmindful of the admonition 
of the Supreme Court that the vitality of those principles ‘cannot be allowed to yield simply 
because of disagreement with them;’ here, however, as pointed out by the Board in its final 
brief, the opposition to integration in Little Rock is more than a mere mental attitude; it has 
manifested itself in overt acts which have actually damaged educational standards and which 
will continue to do so if relief is not granted. 
Id. at 26 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Edu., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)). 
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1956–57 enactments, heretofore outlined, integration in the public 
schools can be lawfully avoided.
56
 
The situation, he concluded, justified granting a “breathing spell in Little 
Rock. . . .”57 
Lemley’s decision “caused jubilation among the ranks of segregationist 
states,” according to news reports.58 It “will do much to re-establish the 
normal and friendly relations which prevailed before here,” said Faubus.59 A 
leader of the Mother’s League of Central High, a local segregationist group 
formed in the midst of the Little Rock desegregation battle, hoped that the 
delay would give the Supreme Court the opportunity to reverse Brown.60 
The Court’s approval of the delay “shows that massive resistance works,” 
said a Louisiana legislator.61 “This gives us a powerful new weapon with 
which to protect our schools.”62 The Washington Post lamented that the 
ruling in effect was an invitation to resistant southern school districts to “use 
violence to obstruct the law.”63 Judge Lemley “has struck a severe blow at 
the cause of integration in the public schools.”64 
The lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(LDF) tried to bypass the federal appeals court and get the Supreme Court to 
review Judge Lemley’s ruling.65 Although the LDF lawyers failed to 
persuade the Supreme Court to take the case at this point, they soon found 
success at the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.66 In an 
August 18, 1958 opinion, the appeals court reversed the district court ruling. 
“[T]he time has not yet come in these United States when an order of a 
Federal Court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully 
withdrawn in the face of violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens in 
opposition thereto,” wrote the court.67 The Eighth Circuit then put a hold on 
 
 56. Id. at 21 
 57. Aaron, 163 F. Supp. at 27. 
 58. Little Rock News Hailed in the South, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 22, 1958, at 2. 
 59. U.S. Judge Lets Little Rock Halt Its Integration, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1958, at 1. 
 60. Id. at 30. 
 61. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 328. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Retreat at Little Rock, WASH. POST, June 23, 1958, at A12. 
 64. Id.; see also Little Rock Decision, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1958, at 16 (“Judge Lemley 
has worked himself into the absurd position of saying that the public interest demands the 
denial of the constitutional rights of citizens. On that theory anybody who takes the trouble to 
organize a mob can force the suspension of free speech, free press, trial by jury, and every 
other guarantee of liberty.”). 
 65. Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566, 567 (1958). 
 66. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN 
THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 232–36 (1994) (detailing LDF efforts to get the case to the Supreme Court). 
 67. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 40. 
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its order to allow the Supreme Court time to consider the school board’s 
request for a petition for a writ of certiorari.68 
The Little Rock school board appealed, and, in an extraordinary step, 
the Supreme Court convened a special summer term to consider the case.69 
After hearing arguments on August 28 and September 11, 1958, the Justices 
issued a three-paragraph per curiam opinion on September 12, 1958, in 
which they unanimously upheld the Eighth Circuit’s ruling.70 Because the 
new school year was imminent, the Court explained, “we deem it important 
to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of 
Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will be 
prepared and announced in due course.”71 
“[W]e figured that the Supreme Court would uphold justice,” was the 
reaction of Ernest Green, one of the Little Rock Nine and the first to 
graduate from Central High School.72 “We are pleased.”73 A leader of a local 
segregationist group had a predictably different reaction, describing the 
Court’s ruling as “one of the most unfortunate things which has ever 
happened to our country in its existence.”74 Arkansas had recently passed a 
law authorizing a special election to vote to close schools if they were 
ordered to desegregate,75 and on September 27, the citizens of Little Rock 
voted to close their schools rather than comply with the court order to 
initiate a desegregation plan.76 
The Court issued its full opinion in Cooper v. Aaron on September 
29.77 The opinion opens with a reference to Faubus’s claim “that there is no 
duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s 
considered interpretation of the United States Constitution”78 and then 
returns in its famous closing paragraphs to the question of constitutional 
interpretative authority.79 Between these dramatic bookends, the opinion 
offers a straightforward summary and legal assessment of the Little Rock 
situation. Following a detailed review of the desegregation saga in Little 
 
 68. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1958). 
 69. Id. at 14; SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 
142–43 (2010). 
 70. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 5. 
 71. Id. at 5 n*, (reprinting per curiam order announced on Sept. 12, 1958). 
 72. Claude Sitton, Faubus Orders 4 Schools Shut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1958, at 1, 8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Act of Sept. 12, 1958, No. 4, Ark. Gen. Assemb., reprinted in School Closing—
Arkansas, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1048, 1048–49 (1958). 
 76. Claude Sitton, Little Rock Vote Supports Faubus on Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 1958, at 1, 52. 
 77. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. Id. at 17–20. 
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Rock,80 the opinion lays out the Court’s reasons for affirming the appeals 
court in rejecting any more delays in implementing the school desegregation 
plan.81 “One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the face 
of the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but, regardless of the 
Board’s good faith, the actions of the other state agencies responsible for 
those conditions compel us to reject the Board’s legal position,” the Court 
explained.82 “The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed 
or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the 
actions of the Governor and Legislature. . . . [L]aw and order are not here to 
be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional 
rights.”83 
With this, the Court had done the work of giving its answer to the legal 
dispute in Little Rock. “What has been said, in the light of the facts 
developed, is enough to dispose of the case.”84 But the Justices had more 
that they wanted to say. In the opinion’s closing paragraphs, they returned to 
the issue they had flagged in the opinion’s opening paragraph: the question 
of judicial authority on matters of constitutional dispute. They would take 
the opportunity to provide their “answer” to “the premise of the actions of 
the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the 
Brown case.”85 
In providing this answer, the opinion presented the most direct, forceful 
endorsement of judicial supremacy the Supreme Court has ever made. 
III. BUILDING THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
In making the case for the Supreme Court’s supremacy over all others 
in assigning meaning to the Constitution, the Justices found support in the 
fact that many outside the Court had been making similar arguments in 
recent years. Although Cooper’s assertion of judicial authority went beyond 
anything the Supreme Court had said before, it was an assertion that a 
growing chorus of people wanted the Justices to make. 
Extrajudicial support for expansive judicial authority, a story with roots 
tracing to the beginnings of the Republic,86 grew in reaction to the South’s 
campaign of organized resistance to Brown. The faith in the power of the 
Supreme Court expressed in Cooper was in large part the product of a 
 
 80. Id. at 5–14. 
 81. Id. at 14–17. 
 82. Id. at 15. 
 83. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
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campaign, inside and outside the Court, to defend Brown. An array of critics 
challenged Brown, ranging from segregationists87 to liberal law professors 
uncomfortable with its legal reasoning.88 Defenders of the decision 
countered with increasingly strident defenses of the Court and its authority 
to interpret the Constitution. 
Although the backlash to Brown took time to coalesce, by the point the 
Court issued its implementation ruling (Brown II) in the spring of 1955, 
segregationist opposition was steadily gaining momentum.89 The basic legal 
claim driving the South’s resistance effort was that the Court simply got it 
wrong in its conclusion that school segregation violated the Constitution, 
and a judicial misreading of the Constitution such as this could and should 
be resisted.90 A resolution the Virginia legislature adopted in early 1956 is 
representative. The Brown decision, it declared, 
constitutes an unlawful and unconstitutional assumption of power which 
does not exist. An agency created by a document to which sovereign 
states were parties cannot lawfully amend the creating document when 
that document clearly specifies in Article V thereof the manner of 
amendment. . . . Until such time as the Constitution of the United States 
may be amended in the manner provided by that Constitution, this 
commonwealth is under no obligation to accept supinely an unlawful 
decree of the Supreme Court of the United States based upon an 
authority which is not found in the Constitution of the United States nor 
any amendment thereto. Rather this commonwealth is in honor bound to 
act to ward off the attempted exercise of a power which does not exist 
lest other excesses be encouraged.
91
 
The Georgia legislature issued its own nullification resolution, stating, 
“[I]t is clear that [the Supreme] Court has deliberately resolved to disobey 
the Constitution of the United States, and to flout and defy the Supreme Law 
of the Land[.]”92 Other southern states issued similar proclamations.93 
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The most prominent challenge to Brown and to the authority of the 
Court came in what became known as the Southern Manifesto, the March 
1956 statement signed by almost all southern members of Congress, which 
denounced the Supreme Court’s “clear abuse of judicial power” in Brown.94 
The law must be based in a community’s “habits, traditions, and way of life” 
of a community, insisted the document’s signatories.95 But with its Brown 
decision, the Supreme Court abandoned “established law.”96 The Justices 
“substituted their personal, political, and social ideas for the established law 
of the land.”97 This was nothing more than an exercise of “naked power.”98 
The Southern Manifesto helped transform scattered discontent and 
prevalent uncertainty into a united resistance movement. According to 
historian C. Vann Woodward, with the Southern Manifesto, “The law of the 
land had been clearly defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and that definition had been just as clearly rejected by responsible 
spokesmen of millions of our people . . . [This] was a real constitutional 
crisis that the country was facing.”99 Harvard Law professor Paul Freund 
wrote that the Manifesto posed “not only a crisis in race relations but—what 
could in the long run be even more shattering—a crisis in the role of the 
Supreme Court as the authoritative voice of our highest law.”100 
The Southern Manifesto’s critics regularly voiced judicial supremacist 
arguments, sounding themes that were quite similar to those the Justices 
invoked in Cooper two years later.101 In December 1956, a hundred leading 
lawyers and law professors signed a statement defending the Supreme Court 
against the Manifesto’s challenges.102 The attacks against the Court, they 
wrote, “have been so reckless in their abuse, so heedless of the value of 
judicial review and so dangerous in fomenting disrespect for our highest law 
that they deserve to be repudiated by the legal profession and by every 
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thoughtful citizen. . . . In cases of disagreement, we have established the 
judiciary to interpret the Constitution for us.”103 
Perhaps the most prominent defender of the Court’s supremacy in 
determining constitutional meaning was President Eisenhower—a point rich 
with irony, since Eisenhower held serious personal reservations toward 
Brown.104 From the time the Court announced Brown, the President openly 
expressed his doubts about the limited ability of the law to change people’s 
beliefs and attitudes; in private he said that Brown had set back racial 
progress in the South.105 When reporters pressed him for his views, 
Eisenhower avoided directly expressing his approval of Brown. Rather, he 
said that he accepted the supremacy of the Court on matters of constitutional 
interpretation. “The Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold 
the constitutional processes in this country, and I will obey,” Eisenhower 
said at a news conference two days after the Court handed down Brown.106 
Two years later, as the forces of the massive resistance campaign gathered 
strength, he said, “I think it makes no difference whether or not I endorse 
[Brown]. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it; and I must 
conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this 
country.”107 
The press also made the case for the supremacy of the Supreme Court. 
“No American is compelled to like the decisions of the Supreme Court,” 
wrote the editors of the Washington Post in September 1957.108 “But for 
more than a century and a half of history and tradition the Supreme Court 
has been the final interpreter of the Constitution. Every American, by virtue 
of his citizenship in the Union, is enjoined to accept and obey the orders of 
the Federal Courts.”109 
Between the time the Justices called a special summer session to hear 
the Cooper case and the release of the Court’s written opinion, the Justices’ 
commitment to using the case as a platform to issue a bold defense of the 
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broader principle of judicial interpretive supremacy only grew, a 
development fueled by the events taking place outside the Court.110 As the 
Justices considered Cooper, Governor Faubus and his segregationist allies in 
Arkansas were mobilizing against federally enforced desegregation. At a 
special session of the Arkansas General Assembly, where Faubus declared 
himself locked in a struggle for “states rights and constitutional 
government,”111 the legislature passed a collection of measures designed to 
preserve racial segregation in the state’s schools, including a bill authorizing 
the governor to shut them down rather than desegregate.112 Faubus 
disavowed his earlier concession in which he accepted Brown as the law of 
the land, claiming that he had only said so because the Eisenhower 
administration had forced him.113 He declared that he would “probably” 
close down the schools rather than allow the desegregation plan to go 
forward, since “it is my feeling that integration could not be accomplished 
without disorder and bloodshed.”114 
Meanwhile, the northern press condemned Faubus’s defiant statements 
and praised the Court for standing its ground. “The children of Little Rock, 
white and Negro alike,” wrote the editors of the New York Herald Tribune, 
“are taught in school to respect the Constitution; they must not be given the 
spectacle of a breach of that document, as interpreted by the highest court in 
the land, whether the breach is committed by a mob or by the executive 
power of the city or state.”115 In rejecting the pleas for more delays, the 
Court “has done what its integrity and the nation’s honor required it to do,” 
wrote the Newark Evening News.116 
At oral argument at the Supreme Court, the Justices were given an up-
close display of the ways in which the Little Rock crisis risked undermining 
their authority. Richard Butler, the lawyer for the Little Rock school board, 
tried to explain to the Justices why the board was asking for a delay in 
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implementing its school desegregation plan.117 A two-and-a-half year delay, 
he explained, would give time so that “a national policy could definitely be 
established” and “laws could be tested so that the people would know, the 
people who want to obey the final word.”118 Justice Felix Frankfurter shot 
back, asking why the Court’s rulings in the two Brown decisions were not 
considered “national policy[.]”119 Chief Justice Warren asked what would 
happen if school districts across the South demanded more legal clarity 
before they were willing to desegregate. Butler explained that the 
desegregation should be delayed while the people in Arkansas “have a doubt 
in their mind and a right to have a doubt,” in large part because the state’s 
leaders, starting with its governor, were urging them to question whether 
they might avoid desegregation. This caused the Chief Justice to lose his 
patience: “I have never heard such an argument made in a Court of Justice 
before. I have never heard a lawyer say that the statement of a Governor as 
to what was legal or illegal should control the action of any court.”120 
The Justices received a steady stream of expressions of support for the 
Court’s preeminence as the nation’s constitutional authority. Outside 
observers saw the drama in the courtroom as providing an object lesson in 
the importance of the Supreme Court. James Reston of the New York Times 
wrote a column that described of the Court’s power in reverential terms: “It 
was the court, in all its majesty, that was in command today. . . .”121 
Briefs filed in Cooper and statements made at the next round of oral 
arguments further bolstered the Justices’ sense of their own interpretative 
authority. The LDF lawyers defined the issue in their brief as “a national test 
of the vitality of the principles enunciated in Brown v. Board of 
Education.”122 But the issue also transcended the school desegregation 
struggle, they wrote. It involved “not only vindication of the constitutional 
rights declared in Brown, but indeed the very survival of the Rule of Law. 
This case affords this Court the opportunity to restate in unmistakable terms 
both the urgency of proceeding with desegregation and the supremacy of all 
constitutional rights over bigots—big and small.”123 At oral argument, LDF 
lead counsel Thurgood Marshall pressed the same points, chiding 
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Arkansas’s lawyers for casting doubt on “the power or authority of the 
Supreme Court.”124 
Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin reinforced the NAACP’s argument. 
“The element in this case is lawlessness[,]” he said at oral argument.125 “In 
Little Rock, the people decided they were going to defy the laws of this 
country.”126 The issue transcended Little Rock, and it transcended the battle 
over school desegregation. “There isn’t a single policeman who isn’t going 
to watch this Court and what it has to say about this matter that doesn’t have 
to deal with people everyday who don’t like the law he is trying to 
administer and enforce. And he has to go against that public feeling and will 
and do his duty.”127 He argued that the school board should “tell the people 
that this Supreme Court has spoken; that’s the law of the land; it’s binding; 
we’ve got to do it[.] . . . [T]hey have a duty as a citizen, the highest duty of a 
citizen, to obey the law and to support the Constitution.”128 The Supreme 
Court must declare “in a manner that cannot be misunderstood, throughout 
the length and breadth of this land: There can be no equality of justice for 
our people if the law steps aside, even for a moment, at the command of 
force and violence.”129 
On September 12, Chief Justice Warren read the Court’s unanimous 
three paragraph per curiam order affirming the court of appeals and thereby 
denying the school board’s request for a delay, and noting that the Justices 
would release their full opinion “in due course.”130 Faubus responded by 
signing into law the various pro-segregation bills the Arkansas legislature 
had recently passed, declaring that he would shut down Little Rock’s four 
high schools so as to prevent “impending violence and disorder[,]” and 
calling for a referendum so that Little Rock could decide whether to close all 
its schools rather than desegregate.131 “Gov. Faubus Defies Court” ran the 
headline in the next day’s Boston Globe.132 
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IV. DECLARING SUPREMACY 
The Court would release its full written opinion in Cooper on 
September 29. To signal the Court’s unanimous commitment to Brown, each 
of the nine Justices signed the opinion,133 but its primary author was Justice 
William Brennan.134 On September 17, Brennan circulated a draft of the 
opinion to the other Justices.135 Most of its eighteen pages were taken up 
with a detailed account of the Little Rock desegregation saga, along with an 
explanation that the Supremacy Clause commanded state and local officials 
to comply with federal court orders.136 After Brennan circulated his draft, the 
other Justices offered editorial suggestions. A common theme in these 
suggestions was the need to do more to emphasize the Court’s authority.137 
Chief Justice Warren felt Brennan’s opening was “rather dry.”138 Justice 
Black urged Brennan to use “more punch and vigor. . . .”139 The Justices 
wanted the opinion to respond to the defiant southern states’ claims that the 
Court had been wrong to rule as it did in Brown and that therefore the states 
were not bound to follow its mandate.140 
In his revisions, Brennan strengthened the Court’s defense of its own 
interpretive supremacy. The claim that Marbury established “the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution” Brennan had initially followed with a qualified defense, 
noting that Marbury “was not without its critics, then and even now[.]”141 
He then concluded: “The country has long since accepted it as a sound, 
correct and permanent interpretation.”142 The revised version had more of 
the courage of its convictions: “the basic principle that the federal judiciary 
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution” is “a permanent 
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”143 The revised 
version also added the stronger opening paragraph, which made clear from 
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the start that the case raised foundational questions about the Court’s 
authority.144 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a letter to Justice John Marshall Harlan II 
several days after the first round of oral arguments in Cooper, articulated his 
belief in the need for a forceful statement of the Court’s authority. The key 
to making school desegregation a reality, he argued, was to win over 
southern moderates.
 145 Rather than trying to persuade this group to accept 
Brown “on the merits,” Frankfurter insisted “they ought to be won, and I 
believe will be won, to the transcending issue of the Supreme Court as the 
authoritative organ of what the Constitution requires.”146 “[T]he ultimate 
hope for the peaceful solution of the basic problem,” Frankfurter explained 
in a letter to Chief Justice Warren, “largely depends on winning the support 
of the lawyers of the South for the overriding issue of obedience to the 
Court’s decision.”147 
Justice Harlan drafted a revised version of the closing section of the 
opinion that he shared with some of the other justices.148 Unlike Brennan’s 
draft, his did not cite Marbury to defend the principle of judicial interpretive 
supremacy. He referenced instead the constitutional oath provision, which 
“embraces of course both acts of Congress and the judgments of this Court, 
which under our federal system has the final responsibility for constitutional 
adjudication.”149 Brennan pushed back, defending his use of Marbury “and 
the detailed discussion in my draft of the Court’s responsibility for the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution.”150 This point, Brennan said, “is a 
very essential part of what I believe our opinion should contain.”151 
By the time of the fourth draft of Cooper—the version that, with only 
minor stylistic changes, the Court would issue on September 29152—
Brennan, with the encouragement of his colleagues, had elevated the 
opinion’s dramatic elements as well as its authoritative tone. Rather than 
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opening with a prosaic factual recitation of the developments that brought 
the case to the Court, the opinion now began with a striking rendering of the 
larger stakes at issue. Justice Black had drafted the bold opening, and Justice 
Brennan incorporated it without change.153 The case “raises questions of the 
highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government. 
. . . Specifically, it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of 
Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown 
v. Board of Education[.]”154 
After defining the larger stakes of the case, the opinion then turns back 
to the details of the Little Rock controversy and the particular legal issues 
presented. Then, twelve pages later, the opinion makes its pivot: “What has 
been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the 
case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor 
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown 
case.”155 This then paved the way for the Court’s declaration that “the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the Constitution” and “the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in 
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land[.]”156 
Cooper was an overwhelmingly popular opinion outside the South. The 
Justices “laid down the law of this land,” wrote the editors of the New York 
Times.157 The ruling “restates once more the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy and the basic principle, recognized as fundamental to the 
American system ever since the days of John Marshall, ‘that the Federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.’”158 The 
ruling 
simply reiterates in strong and clear language, understandable even to the 
most fanatical segregationist, that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Constitution is the law, that the desegregation decision stands, that 
neither direct nullification nor indirect evasion will be tolerated, that 
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state officials are as subject to Federal law as anyone else, that violent 
resistance to this law is futile[.]
159
 
“The Court has silenced once and for all the segregationists who have 
placed preservation of law and order above constitutional rights,” wrote the 
editors of the Chicago Defender.160 An approving C. Vann Woodward 
described the tone of the Cooper decision as “judicial rhetoric . . . 
amounting to anger.”161 
V. COOPER’S CRITICS 
That most of the white South would denounce what the Court did in 
Cooper was surely expected. Perhaps less expected was that after the Little 
Rock crisis receded from the headlines, and after Brown had been elevated 
to iconic status in the consciousness of the public and the legal academy, 
Cooper has remained the target of a persistent stream of criticism and even 
ridicule. 
One of the earliest and most influential of these critiques of Cooper 
came from Yale law professor Alexander Bickel. In his classic 1962 book, 
The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel chided defenders of Brown, including 
the justices themselves, for failing to adequately respond to the attacks on 
Brown by the white South.162 Southerners attacked the Court in Brown for 
having “botched the job that [Chief Justice John] Marshall describes in 
Marbury v. Madison; pretty obviously, the Court had performed some other 
function, not the one there indicated.”163 The Court’s response in Cooper 
was to assert that based on Marbury, 
the Court is empowered to lay down the law of the land, and citizens 
must accept it uncritically. Whatever the Court lays down is right, even 
if wrong, because the Court and only the Court speaks in the name of the 
Constitution. Its doctrines are not to be questioned; indeed, they are 
hardly a fit subject for comment. The Court has spoken. The Court must 
be obeyed. There must be good order and peaceable submission to lawful 
authority.
164
 
This, Bickel argued, was the essence of the Court’s pronouncement in 
Cooper. Bickel’s arch hyperbole made this perhaps the most memorable of 
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Cooper takedowns, but his was only an early exemplar of a long line of 
Cooper critiques by legal luminaries. 
From across the ideological spectrum, scholars have made sport out of 
taking shots at Cooper’s judicial supremacist language. The Court got 
“carried away with its own sense of righteousness” in Cooper, wrote 
University of Chicago law professor Philip Kurland.165 He also described 
Cooper as an expression of the “the Court’s Louis XIV’s notion of itself, 
l’etat, c’est moi[.]’”166 “[I]n the drama of the occasion,” wrote J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, a law professor who is now a respected federal judge, “the Court 
went somewhat overboard, with a sweeping and unprecedented assertion of 
its own authority and place.”167 Cooper’s proclamation of the Court’s 
authority, he added, was “both unrealistic and undesirable.”168 Another 
scholar dismissed Cooper’s “bombast,”169 and Professor Sanford Levinson 
has described Cooper’s declaration of the Court’s interpretive supremacy as 
“really quite preposterous in its depiction of American history.”170 “If a 
student wrote such a statement in a final exam,” he added, “it would receive 
a D from a generous grader[.]”171 Larry Kramer referred to Cooper’s 
supremacist claims as “just bluster and puff.”172 
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The most controversial challenge to Cooper came in 1986, when 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave a speech at Tulane University 
entitled “The Law of the Constitution.” In celebrating the Constitution, 
Meese insisted on the need to distinguish the document’s text from the 
Court’s interpretation of that text.173 “[A]lthough the point may seem 
obvious,” he said, “there have been those down through our history—and 
especially, it seems, in our own time—who have denied the distinction 
between the Constitution and constitutional law.”174 To drive home his 
point, he took aim at Cooper: 
Some thirty years ago, in the midst of great racial turmoil, our highest 
Court seemed to succumb to this very temptation. By a flawed reading of 
our Constitution and Marbury v. Madison, and an even more faulty 
syllogism of legal reasoning, the Court in a 1958 case called Cooper v. 
Aaron appeared to arrive at conclusions about its own power that would 
have shocked men like John Marshall and Joseph Story. . . . The logic of 
Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the Constitution, at war with 
the basic principles of democratic government, and at war with the very 
meaning of the rule of law.
175
 
Meese’s remarks were met with scathing criticism. American Civil 
Liberty Union executive director Ira Glasser denounced them as “an 
invitation to lawlessness and a breach of constitutional duty to uphold the 
law.”176 He questioned whether Meese also sought to undermine Brown.177 
“Why Give That Speech?” asked the headline of a Washington Post 
editorial.178 The Attorney General’s distinction between the Constitution and 
constitutional decisions, and his claim that the Court’s decisions are “not 
permanent and fixed or immune from challenge” was, the Post’s editors 
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noted, “self-evident[.]”179 But the speech was “very troublesome” because of 
the “signal” he was sending that rulings might not bind anyone beyond the 
parties to litigation.180 Failing to make clear that court rulings do indeed 
extend beyond litigants “is to permit the inference that a Supreme Court 
decision has no general applicability and that citizens may choose to ignore 
rulings at will. That’s an invitation to constitutional chaos and an expression 
of contempt for the federal judiciary and the rule of law.”181 Former 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark dismissed Meese’s speech as “essentially a 
clumsy, vague assault on law” and an expression of “unusual notions[.]”182 
In response, Meese backtracked somewhat. He explained that he 
believed constitutional decisions are indeed “law” and “they are the law of 
the land in the sense that they do indeed have general applicability and 
deserve the greatest respect from all Americans.”183 He defended “[t]he 
process of debating, litigating and legislating in response to a constitutional 
decision one thinks wrong. . . . This process demonstrates that dialogue 
among our political institutions and among the American people helps us 
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follow our supreme law, the Constitution.”184 Meese’s defenders insisted 
that his critique of Cooper was not with the holding but with, as one of 
Meese’s aides put it, “the pretentious obiter dictum the court saw fit to 
append to that decision.”185 
VI. MAKING SENSE OF COOPER 
How to make sense of Cooper? Why has a decision that is so obviously 
right in so many ways become the target of such a persistent barrage of 
attacks? And why, even in the face of these attacks, does the decision retain 
such a prominent, even revered place in our constitutional history? In this 
section, I offer three observations to help explain Cooper’s distinctive 
position in the canon of great Supreme Court opinions. 
A. The Cooper Two-Step 
In Cooper, the justices engaged three overlapping issues: racial 
segregation, the rule of law, and the rule of the Supreme Court. Cooper’s 
treatment of the first issue was most notable at the time of the decision, and 
it is probably what the decision is best remembered for today. Cooper’s 
resonant assertion of the unconstitutionality of state-mandated segregation 
in schools and the rightness of Brown provided a principled commitment to 
racial equality that still resonates today. The Justices memorably 
emphasized their united commitment to Brown by taking the unusual step of 
listing each of the nine Justices as the joint authors of the opinion. 
Cooper also staked out a clear position on the rule of law, denouncing 
the effects of the segregationists’ massive resistance campaign and insisting 
that “violence and disorder” could not justify denying constitutional 
rights.186 This point received widespread approbation at the time and ever 
since.187 
The third issue on which the justices staked out a position in Cooper 
was on the authority of the Supreme Court. This position is found in 
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Cooper’s sweeping concluding proclamation of the Court’s exclusive 
prerogative on matters of constitutional interpretation.188 
Of these three sides to Cooper, the first two have stood the test of time 
while the third remains contested. One of the challenges in assessing Cooper 
is the difficulty in speaking about the third issue—the contestable claim to 
judicial interpretive supremacy—without calling into question the first two. 
Thus, we have what we might call the Cooper two-step: critics of judicial 
supremacy attack Cooper; in response, critics of these critics accuse them of 
attacking Brown or undermining the rule of law. This often leads to a 
strategic retreat by Cooper’s critics. The Meese episode provides the most 
famous example of the Cooper two-step. 
Like the parable of the elephant and the blind men, it can be difficult to 
talk about Cooper because the opinion means different things to different 
people at different times. 
B. The Politics of Judicial Supremacy 
Bolstering the authority of the Supreme Court has often held political 
advantages, and not only for the Court itself. Consider the case of President 
Eisenhower. He was skeptical of the Brown ruling. In terms of his views 
about the Court’s interpretive supremacy, his skepticism manifested in 
contradictory ways. His apparent belief that the Court got it wrong in Brown 
necessarily implied skepticism toward the Court’s interpretive supremacy. 
But he also fell back on interpretive supremacy to justify his actions to 
enforce Brown without taking responsibility for the decision itself. In his 
address to the nation after sending the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division 
to Little Rock, Eisenhower said that he was acting to prevent “anarchy” and 
“mob rule,” which was undermining the nation’s standing in the world.189 
“Our personal opinions about the [Supreme Court’s school desegregation] 
decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement; the responsibility 
and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution are very 
clear.”190 He called on white southerners to “respect the law even when they 
disagree with it.”191 What he did not do was to make any statement about 
school desegregation or about the Court’s ruling in Brown. As he wrote in a 
private correspondence later in the fall of 1957, “[M]y main interest is not in 
the integration or segregation question. . . . The point is that specific orders 
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of our courts, taken in accordance with the terms of the Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, must be upheld.”192 
A year later, as the Court was about to consider the Cooper case, 
Eisenhower’s strategic embrace of judicial interpretive supremacy remained 
unchanged. When a reporter pressed Eisenhower to talk about his “own 
personal feeling on the principle involved” in the school desegregation 
controversy, Eisenhower responded, 
I have always declined to do that for the simple reason that here was 
something that the Supreme Court says, “This is the direction of the 
Constitution, this is the instruction of the Constitution”; that is, they say, 
“This is the meaning of the Constitution.” 
Now, I am sworn to one thing, to defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and execute its laws. Therefore, for me to weaken public opinion 
by discussion of separate cases, where I might agree or might disagree, 
seems to me to be completely unwise and not a good thing to do. 
I have an oath; I expect to carry it out. And the mere fact that I could 
disagree very violently with a decision, and would so express myself, 
then my own duty would be much more difficult to carry out I think. So I 
think it is just not good business for me to do so.
193
 
Eisenhower thus found deference to the Court’s supremacy over 
constitutional interpretation a way to avoid having to publicly embrace a 
ruling with which he held deep misgivings. He found political shelter 
beneath the protective umbrella of the Court’s authority. 
The Justices arrived at their own commitment to judicial interpretive 
supremacy for the opposite reason: they were committed to the rightness of 
Brown. Because they were so committed to Brown, they unanimously 
signed an opinion that went out of its way to defend an excessive and 
unrealistic vision of judicial supremacy. 
Yet the Justices spoke from a position of vulnerability as well as 
commitment. At a time when the Justices were hesitant to expand Brown 
with further guidance on desegregation,194 they chose to write in Cooper a 
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resounding defense of judicial supremacy. “Invariably, the Court takes a 
bold stand because it fears that the political order will ignore its command,” 
write Neal Devins and Louis Fisher.195 The Court makes its most “sweeping 
declarations of power” to “cloak institutional self-doubts, much as a gorilla 
pounds his chest and makes threatening noises to avoid a fight.”196 Cooper 
was written from a defensive, vulnerable posture.197 The Court was lashing 
back at its critics. Apprehensive about the institution’s vulnerabilities, the 
Justices drew on their most powerful resource, the judicial proclamation, 
expressed with the authority of a written opinion by the highest court in the 
land, and deployed its hyperbolic assertion of its own supremacy. 
C. Public Acceptance of Judicial Supremacy 
A final reason Cooper remains such a powerful monument in our 
constitutional landscape is that despite its bluster and its unrealistic portrayal 
of the Court’s interpretive authority, the American people often act as if they 
want the Court to serve this role. Indeed, the strongest arguments in defense 
of judicial supremacy fall back not on the merits of the supremacist position 
itself, but on the fact that the public has largely accepted the Court in this 
role.198 The power of judicial review, Chief Justice Edward Douglas White 
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once said, rests “solely upon the approval of a free people.”199 This point can 
also be applied to the claims of judicial interpretive supremacy. Although 
the American people often disagree with particular rulings of the Supreme 
Court, they have generally accepted that the Court should be recognized as 
the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.200 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This is where the idea of judicial supremacy over constitutional 
interpretation stands today. It is a claim about the Supreme Court and the 
Constitution that goes against logic, against history, against basic 
democratic principles. But it is also a claim about the Court that is broadly 
accepted as a truism of American constitutionalism—a description of the 
way it is and the way it ought to be. 
Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court’s seminal declaration of its own 
interpretive supremacy, is, at its core, as right and true as any decision the 
Court has handed down. The Court squarely and powerfully stood up for the 
right cause, and it squarely and powerfully pushed aside the claims of those 
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Edwin Corwin attributed the strength of judicial interpretive supremacy to “professional bias” 
among lawyers. EDWIN S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 74 (1938). “Brought up on the 
principle of stare decisis, taught to search for the law in the past decisions of the Court, the 
bar has naturally been prone to identify the judicial version of the Constitution as the 
authentic Constitution.” Id. Corwin quoted a striking articulation of judicial supremacist 
thinking by Senator M.M. Logan of Kentucky in 1933. The Supreme Court “is solely vested 
with the authority to tell us what the Constitution means,” the senator explained. 
It may be that we could say that we disagree with its opinion, but however much 
we may disagree with the opinion of the Supreme Court, that opinion is right. It 
may not have been right five minutes before the opinion was delivered; it may not 
have been right during the entire history of the Nation up to that time; but the very 
moment that that opinion is handed down and goes into the law books, when it 
becomes final, then the Constitution means and must mean exactly what the 
Supreme Court says its means. 
Id. at 75 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 1257 (1933)). 
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who stood in the way. It is a heroic decision. But like any real-life hero, it is 
a flawed hero. 
